In recent years, political and financial economists and other social scientists have begun adopting spin and lattice models into their theoretical tool kit. This article introduces examples of how these models are used, and points to some state of the art references. For illustration, a simple dynamical model of how legal rules evolve and propagate in the AngloAmerican court system is described.
Almost two centuries ago, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote "The life of the law has not been knowledge: it has been experience. The felt necessities of the time, ... avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow men, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men [are] governed." Likewise, the German legal scholar Friedrich Karl von Savigny wrote that "All law... is first developed by custom and [conventional morality], next by jurisprudence,-everywhere, therefore, by internal silently-operating powers, not by the arbitrary will of a law-giver."
Holmes' "felt necessities" and von Savigny's "internal silently-operating powers" have not gone unnoticed by modern scholars. Modern legal scholars, ranging from Grant Gilmore to Lawrence Friedman, have observed that changes in law at various times are "rapid and violent," "clean and swift," and "highly fluctuating" (Yee 2001 ). In current events, a growing branch of intellectual property, "cyberspace law," has emerged almost overnight in response to technological innovations and business needs. Moreover, capital markets anticipate such changes in a rational way (Yee 2005 (Yee , 2006 . Hence, it comes as no surprise that Holmes' "felt necessities" and von Savigny's "internal silently-operating powers" drive the basis of an evolutionary framework for understanding the developement the common law (Priest 1977; Rubin 1977 ). The idea is based on Darwinian natural selection: efficient legal rules survive while inefficient rules are culled out by litigation. In the long run, the common law contains only rules that survive legal and political challenges.
While this paradigm is appealing, it has not yielded empirically refutable predictions which would seriously test the model.
This article introduces a dynamical model of common law evolution originally described in Yee (2001) . According to this model, evolution leaves an inevitable trail of paleontological footprints which may be sitting in the Westlaw dunes awaiting empirical identification by legal excavators.
Biological evolution starts with a collection of genes (random degrees of freedom) created by chance chemistry in the earth's primordial atmosphere.
These early genes competed against each other to survive and replicate. Ultimately, the biological structures we see today, including their inorganic byproducts such as computer software or the price of wheat futures emerged from this competition. Emergence is not imposed exogenously. Rather, structures emerge inevitably from natural selection, which in turn is an inherent consequence of competitive interactions and selective reproduction.
Natural selection and evolution does not only occur in a biological setting.
Any system is evolutionary if it has the following four ingredients: set of degrees of freedom or individuals, each ranked by a quality or behavior-based fitness criterion, a selection process based on the fitness ranking, and a mechanism for introducing (usually random) mutations to periodically interject diversity into the reproductive process.
The common law has these four ingredients. As depicted in Figure 2 , precedents of the common law are the "individuals" undergoing Darwinian evolution. A precedent's "economic efficiency" is the degree to which it balances between legal and political forces. Economic efficiency plays the role of Darwinian fitness. The fitness-preferring selection process is provided by the premise that inefficient precedents are subject to more challenges (either in the courts or in the legislature) and hence are more subject to alteration than efficient ones.
Mutations are introduced by the volatile nature of litigation or legislation.
As pointed out by many authors, notably Priest (1977) and Rubin (1977) , common law precedents tend to evolve towards economic efficiency because inefficient precedents are selectively challenged and ultimately culled away as judges Figure 1 when the evolving system is the common law (or any precedent-based legal regime). At any time step t is a collection of laws or precedents. As these precedents are applied to regulate social and economic activity, disputes arise concerning their meaning and social desirability. Accordingly, lawsuits (or legislative challenges) seeking to overturn the precedents in controversy are filed. One precedent is more legally "fit" than another if it suffers fewer such challenges. Copies of the unchallenged (and hence the fittest) precedents survive intact to reign at subsequent time step t + 1. The challenged precedents, facing judicial modification or termination with each litigation, have a decreased chance of unaltered survival. Moreover, all precedents (challenged and unchallenged) are subject to random mutations stemming from external social pressures which may alter their meaning or applicability at any time. Thus at each new time step is an evolving common law comprised of precedents which are selectively reproduced and mutated replicas of their ancestors.
eventually hit on more efficient and hence less-challenged doctrines even if only by random trial and error. In this view, the common law is a market of doctrines, and a law suit is a bid on a specific doctrine. Intensive litigation moves this market towards efficiency whether or not judges consciously choose efficiency because inefficient doctrines will be intensively relitigated until they are efficient.
While this market view is a compelling premise, it is not all there is to the story. Evolution is more than a push towards improvement. Biological evolution has provided a rich history of paleontological footprints: punctuated equilibria, Zipf's Law, and path-dependency. Accordingly, taking the evolutionary paradigm seriously requires considering its dynamical properties-the paleontological footprints. In Yee (2001) I propose a dynamical model ("CLM") of common law evolution. Cast as parsimoniously as possible, CLM in its simplest guise is mathematically isomorphic to the Bak-Sneppen models (Bak and Sneppen 1993; see also Yee 1993) and yields interesting paleontology. As discussed, CLM exhibits punctuated equilibrium, Zipf's Law, path dependency, and a stochastic (but statistically robust) form of efficiency I shall refer to as "smeared" economic efficiency.
The Common Law Model ("CLM")
Economic efficiency of a precedent can change either because (α) the precedent is altered as a result of a court decision or legislation; or its (β) legal environment or (γ) social context changes while the precedent itself remains constant. (β) recognizes that changes in related laws may induce a change in the economic efficiency of an unaltered precedent. For instance, a modification of traffic laws may distort the economic efficiency of a prevailing "reasonable man" standard in torts without any direct change to the standard itself. Likewise, (γ) says that social or cultural changes, perhaps driven by technological innovations, may induce the economic efficiency of a law to change without any changes to the law itself. In this Introduction, I shall assume that changes in economic efficiency are due entirely to (α) and (β), not (γ).
With this caveat in mind, my CLM has just two ingredients:
• a set of N ≥ 3 precedents labeled by integers i ∈ I ≡ {1, 2, · · · , N };
• a real-valued economic fitness measure e : I −→ [0, 1] where e = 0 represents the worst and e = 1 the best possible economic efficiency level.
CLM evolves in time according to the following three rules:
• (I) the precedent i litigated at each time step is the one with the smallest efficiency value e(i);
• (II) litigation of precedent i results in a court ruling which potentially alters not only i but also i's neighboring precedents 1 i + 1 and i − 1;
• (III) litigation outcomes are random in efficiency e, that is courts don't strive to optimize efficiency. In view of Rule (II), this means a litigation 1 I assume that precedent space I wraps around so that i = N and i = 1 are next door neighbors. This wrap-around assumption has negligible effect on my results when N is sufficiently large (e.g. if N >> 10). In real life, the common law arguably has thousands of precedents. Rule (III) assumes that litigation results are entirely random with respect to economic efficiency. While this assumption was selected for its minimalistic nature, it is not as detached from real life as some practitioners are apt to believe. In addition to the everchanging mix of judicial philosophies and idiosyncrasies flowing in and out of the judicial system, judges also make their share of mistakes. As it is, even the Supreme Court's decisions are demonstrably random in some contexts, such as in at least one area of securities regulation.
A simplified toy model helps elucidate CLM. For the toy model, assume efficiency of each precedent can take on only three values High, Medium, and Low, and litigation of one precedent bears no consequences for its neighbors.
While these assumptions ignore critical elements of CLM-notably Rule II, the interprecedent interaction rule, it serves as a starting point to develop intuition.
In the earlier rounds of the toy model, one third of the precedents will be Low, and they will be litigated first. In each trial, two times out of three the judge will replace the Low precedent with one of a higher score. After While equilibrium is reached some time before the 5 × 10 4 th time step, the precedent continues to evolve and fluctuate in efficiency. Thus, equilibrium is not static: while certain collective properties of the system stablize at equilibrium, individual precedents continue to evolve and mutate.
CLM, spurts of intense litigation for each precedent are interspersed with irregular periods of inactivity. Figure 3 depicts the efficiency of a typical precedent as a function of time.
